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Administrative Law-EMERGENCY RULEMAKING IN FLORIDA-
Krajenta v. Division of Workers' Compensation, 376 So. 2d 1200
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1 lays the statu-
tory foundation for agency rulemaking. It provides two methods
for the adoption of agency rules: one for emergency situations and
one to be used under normal circumstances.2 The major differences
between the two rulemaking procedures are in the requirements
for notice and for affording an opportunity for public hearing.'
Normally, the agency must publish its intended action in the Flor-
ida Administrative Weekly and notify the Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee twenty-one days before a rule becomes ef-
fective.' When the emergency rulemaking procedures apply, how-
ever, no prior notice or publication is required. The emergency rule
is effective upon filing with the secretary of state.5 Normal
rulemaking procedures also permit persons affected by proposed
rules other than those which relate exclusively to organization, pro-
cedure, or practice to request a public hearing. The pendency of
the hearing delays the effective date of the rule.' No comparable
hearing procedure is available to persons affected by an emergency
rule.7 Due to these differences, the normal rulemaking procedure is
substantially more time-consuming than the emergency rulemak-
ing process.
Emergency rulemaking is not without its procedural safeguards,
however. As a prerequisite to implementation of an emergency
rule, the agency must publish specific facts supporting a finding of
immediate danger to the public health, safety, and welfare.8 Fur-
thermore, the agency must publish a statement that the proce-
dures used in adopting the emergency rule were "fair under the
circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest."9
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1979).
2. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1979).
3. Id. § 120.54(1) (notice), (3) (opportunity for public hearing) (1979). The standing re-
quired to present evidence during rulemaking is considerably less stringent than that re-
quired to challenge an already-adopted rule. See School Board of Orange County v. Black-
ford, 369 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(11), .545 (1979).
5. Id. § 120.54(9) (1979). An emergency rule can become effective at a date later than
filing if the rule so specifies.
6. Id. § 120.54(3) (1979).
7. Id. § 120.54(9) (1979).
8. Id.
9. Id. The procedures also must at least provide the procedural safeguards required by
other statutes and the state and federal constitutions. Id.
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Perhaps in response to the relaxed procedural safeguards in the
provisions for emergency rulemaking, agencies are often lax in
their efforts to allege the requisite public danger when promulgat-
ing emergency rules. Consequently, when an emergency rule
reaches the courts for review, the agency findings of emergency are
rigorously evaluated.10 Krajenta v. Division of Workers' Compen-
sation" was no exception to this practice. As in most cases arising
out of emergency rules, one of the issues in Krajenta was whether
the agency had adequately shown an immediate danger to the
public.
On November 2, 1978, Edward Krajenta was injured during the
course of his employment as a baker. Approximately nine months
later, he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the
Division of Labor. Two days prior to Krajenta's filing, however,
authority for implementing Florida's Workers' Compensation Law
had been transferred from the Division of Labor to a newly-cre-
ated Division of Workers' Compensation (the Division)."
Immediately upon its creation the new Division adopted its rules
of procedure in the form of an emergency rule. 3 The Division's
emergency rule required a claim to be more specific than those
previously filed with the Division of Labor.14 Krajenta's claim, filed
in accordance with the old rules, lacked the required specificity.
The claim was rejected for failing to meet the informational re-
quirements contained in the Division's emergency rule.18 Krajenta
petitioned the Second District Court of Appeal to review the rejec-
tion of his claim. He alleged that the agency had improperly
adopted the emergency rule which required the new information, 6
10. Judicial requirements for strict compliance with mandated procedure should be dis-
tinguished from judicial imposition of additional procedural requirements. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) pre-
cipitated much debate on this issue. See 28 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 411 (1979); 28 DEPAUL
UNIV. L. REV. 171 (1979).
11. 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
12. Ch. 79-400, 1979 Fla. Laws 2017 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1979)).
13. Emergency Rule 38 FER 79-4 (summarized at FLA. AD. WEEKLY, Aug. 3, 1979, at 26).
The emergency rule contained 16 sections dealing with everything from "Original Reports to
be Filed," to "Destruction of Obsolete Records."
14. The Division alleged that the revised Workers' Compensation Act necessitated the
more specific claims. The revised act required a claim to include information so as to put
the Division and the employer on notice with respect to the identity of the parties and the
specific compensation benefit sought. The "old" act had only required information necessary
to put the Division and the employer on notice with respect to the identity of the parties
and the general nature of the claim. 376 So. 2d at 1201-02.
15. 376 So. 2d at 1201.
16. Petition for Review of Non-final Administrative Action at 4, Krajenta v. Division of
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and that the agency had denied him substantive and procedural
due process in refusing to accept a claim filed in accordance and
compliance with the prior rules for an injury predating adoption of
the emergency rule.17
Before the court could address the validity of the rule it had to
address the Division's claim that Krajenta had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies.'8 According to the Division, the legis-
lature had provided a specific and adequate administrative remedy
by which to challenge emergency rules. A failure to exhaust this
administrative remedy prevented a judicial determination as to the
validity of an emergency rule.'
The issue of whether administrative review of an emergency rule
is a prerequisite to challenging it in court had been decided previ-
ously in Postal Colony Co. v. Askew. 0 In Postal Colony, the court
held that failure to proceed in a rule challenge proceeding before
the Division of Administrative Hearings did not constitute a fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies.'
The Postal Colony court based its finding on three provisions in
the APA. Two provisions specified that failure to administratively
challenge nonemergency rules did not constitute failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.2 2 The third provision, relating to emer-
gency rules, provided that an "agency's findings of immediate dan-
ger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially review-
Workers' Compensation, 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Petition].
17. Id. at 7.
18. Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's Petition
for Review of Non-final Administrative Action at 1, Krajenta v. Division of Workers' Com-
pensation, 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Motion to
Dismiss]. The Administrative Procedure Act provides two methods by which an emergency
rule may be challenged. A party adversely affected may challenge the emergency rule by
petition to the district court of appeal, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(9)(a)3, .68(1) (1979), or, any
substantially affected person, may seek an administrative determination of whether a rule is
a valid exercise of delegated authority before the Division of Administrative Hearings. FLA.
STAT. § 120.56(1) (1979). When the challenged rule is an emergency rule the administrative
proceeding is expedited. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(4) (1979).
19. Motion to Dismiss at 2. Krajenta chose to file suit rather than to amend his claim
because to file a more specific claim, as required by the revised statute and the implement-
ing emergency rule, allegedly required him to obtain information from the employer which
was unavailable absent discovery proceedings. Unfortunately, such discovery proceedings
are dependent upon filing of a valid claim. Petition at 3.
20. 348 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
21. Id. at 339.
22. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(d) (1979); Ch. 75-191, § 5, 1975 Fla. Laws 368 (current version
at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(5) (1979)).
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able." Reading these sections in pari materia the court concluded
that failure to administratively challenge emergency rules did not
constitute failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Using Postal Colony as persuasive precedent and remarking on
the speed with which emergency rules are adopted, the Krajenta
court found that emergency rules are directly reviewable by the
courts.2 4 The Krajenta court then noted that the Division's state-
ment of immediate danger to the public was predicated on the as-
sumption that all rules promulgated by the former Division of La-
bor for administration of the workers' compensation program had
terminated along with the existence of that division. According to
the new Division, the resulting absence of rules and the in-
feasibility of quickly adopting permanent rules would prevent it
from administering the Workers' Compensation Law. Conse-
quently, a public danger existed.28
The court disagreed with the Division's assumption. It believed
that the prior rules remained in effect. The court questioned
whether the Division was in fact a new agency or merely an old
agency renamed.26 Nevertheless, the court found that the absence
of rules on the day the Division was created did not constitute an
emergency. 27 Consequently, the Division's procedural rules were
not adopted in accordance with the statutory provisions for emer-
gency rulemaking and were invalid.28 The court accordingly di-
rected the Division to accept Krajenta's claim under the rules
which were effective prior to the reorganization.
The Krajenta decision was foreshadowed by earlier challenges to
23. Ch. 74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)3
(1979)).
24. 376 So. 2d at 1202 (citing Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections, 375
So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) which in turn relied on Postal Colony). The admin-
istrative determination of the validity of a rule is limited to determining whether the
rulemaking action was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. FLA. STAT. §
120.56 (1979). Consequently, Krajenta alleged that an administrative proceeding would not
provide an adequate remedy. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum at 2, Krajenta v. Division of
Workers' Compensation, 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
25. 376 So. 2d at 1203. The Division noted that under normal rulemaking proceedings it
would have to wait at least 21 days in order tomeet the notice requirements, and that
requests for publc hearings were also a possibility. Motion to Dismiss at 7.
26. 376 So. 2d at 1203.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1201. Krajenta also had argued that the emergency rule could not be applied
to claims arising prior to August 1, 1979, but the court, by finding the rule invalid, was not
required to address the issue of retroactivity. Id. at 1202.
29. Id. at 1203.
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agency emergency rulemaking.3 0 While it is difficult to discern a
clear-cut policy or a statement of law from the cases preceding
Krajenta, the courts have been resolute in striking down those
emergency rules which are not adopted in strict compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act's emergency rulemaking
provisions. 1
In Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections,32 the
company challenged the adequacy of the Department's conclusion
that an immediate danger existed to the public if media access to
death row inmates was not limited during the pendency of an exe-
cution." The Department of Corrections had issued a short state-
ment alleging that its rule was necessary to maintain prison secur-
ity when an execution was imminent."
In response to the rule challenge, the Department attempted to
supplement its conclusion that an emergency existed by providing
the court with affidavits from the Florida State Prison Superinten-
dent and the Department Secretary. 8 Although the court indi-
cated that the information in the affidavits may have been suffi-
cient to substantiate the agency's action, the court nonetheless
30. See Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 304
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, 355 So. 2d
1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Postal Colony Co. v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
31. 376 So. 2d at 1202. In addition to challenging the alleged emergency, these rules may
be challenged on their allegations of procedural fairness. Although the courts have invited
such a challenge, none has been made. See Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Correc-
tions, 375 So. 2d 307, 309 n.3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
32. 375 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
33. Id. at 305. Emergency Rule 33 FER 79-1 (summarized at FLA. AD. WEEKLY, June 15,
1979, at 14) provided that when a death warrant was issued, all regularly scheduled media
interviews with death row offenders would be cancelled until after such warrant was exe-
cuted, expired, or was stayed for a period that would definitely exceed its expiration date.
The effect of the emergency rule was to suspend, during the period of an outstanding war-
rant, the operation of the Department's permanent rule, FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-15.02(c),
which provided for final interviews with inmates sentenced to death on the Wednesday prior
to the execution date. 375 So. 2d at 306. At the time the emergency rule was promulgated no
death warrant was outstanding. The week following promulgation, however, two warrants
were signed by the Governor. Id. at 305.
34. 375 So. 2d at 305.
35. Id. at 306. The affidavit of Florida State Prison Superintendent David H. Brierton
recited his experience and difficulties during the time of the Spenkelink execution in May
1979, and why he felt that the emergency rule was necessary for the security of the prison.
The affidavit of Department Secretary Louie Wainwright stated that he had considered the
recommendations of Superintendent Brierton, and that based upon his knowledge of prison
security needs, he felt that the rule was necessary to avoid a serious security problem at the
prison. Id.
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found the Department's emergency rule to be invalid since the rea-
sons and facts relied upon by the Department at the time it
adopted the emergency rules did not substantiate its finding of an
immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare. 6
Three weeks after the second district court's decision in Times
Publishing, the Department of Corrections again attempted to
adopt the same emergency rule. 7 The new promulgation relied
upon a statement which included facts contained in the affidavits
furnished in the previous litigation."8 The first district court held
that the Department had stated specific facts and reasons suffi-
cient to show the necessity to adopt an emergency rule restricting
media access to the general death row population during the short
time an unexecuted death warrant is outstanding.s9 As to the spe-
cific prisoners whose executions were imminent, however, the court
found that the Department's statement of facts and reasons was
still inadequate since, rather than a brief interruption in their ac-
cess to the media, those awaiting execution were barred forever
from media access. "° Noting that the Department had been at lib-
erty to begin normal rulemaking procedures but had not done so,
the court stated that an "'[e]mergency created wholly by an
agency's failure to take timely action cannot justify extraordinary
suspensions or extensions of the statutory schedule.' 41
In Postal Colony the Governor and Cabinet, acting as the Ad-
ministration Commission, attempted to adopt an emergency rule
to provide comprehensive land development regulations for the
Green Swamp area of critical state concern. 3 The statutory provi-
sions regarding the creation of such areas required that land devel-
opment regulations for areas of critical state concern must become
effective within one year of the designation or the designation
36. Id. The court based its opinion that the emergency must exist prior to or at the time
of promulgation of the rule on the provision that "the agency publishes in writing at the
time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger
to the public." FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)3 (1979). The court held that in issuing affidavits
after the promulgation, the Department had not complied with these requirements. 375 So.
2d at 306.
37. Times Publishing Co. v. Department of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
38. Id. at 311-12.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. The court also held that the Department would not be allowed to extend the life
of emergency rules, normally valid for only 90 days, by tacking one invalid rule to another.
Id. at 311.
41. Id. at 311 (quoting Postal Colony, 348 So. 2d at 342).
42. 348 So. 2d at 339.
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would lapse.' 3 In an effort to avoid lapse of the year-old designa-
tion of critical state concern 4 the Administration Commission
tried to adopt land development regulations by emergency rule."5
It alleged that if the Green Swamp area was not protected by such
a designation, an immediate danger would exist to the water sup-
ply for central Florida.46 The court found that the emergency was
not created by a contamination of wetlands or by other develop-
ment which may have been threatening to the water supply, "but
rather by an avoidable administrative failure to make the neces-
sary regulations effective within the time allowed.) 4 7
In finding that the delay caused by the time-consuming nature
of the permanent rulemaking procedure could not justify the adop-
tion of an emergency rule, the Krajenta holding is also similar to
that of Florida Home Builders Association v. Division of Labor.4
There, the Division of Labor had proposed a permanant rule which
established standards to govern the approval of apprenticeship
programs. The proposed rule had been challenged in an adminis-
trative proceeding and its adoption was thereby delayed. The Divi-
sion of Labor then attempted to adopt the challenged rule as an
emergency rule and Florida Home Builders Association filed a pe-
tition for judicial review.4" Before finding that petitioners lacked
standing to challenge the emergency rule,60 the court noted that an
43. Ch. 72-317, § 5, 1972 Fla. Laws 1162 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 380.05(9)
(1979)).
44. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 22F-5 (designating Green Swamp as an area of critical state
concern).
45. 348 So. 2d at 340. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE E.R. 22 FER-75-1 to 30. The Administra-
tion Commission's normal rulemaking proceedings were delayed by a rule challenge pro-
ceeding so that the rules adopted June 17, 1975, could not be filed until after the proceeding
was concluded on Friday, June 27. The rules were filed with the secretary of state the fol-
lowing Monday with an effective date four days after the designation lapsed. 348 So. 2d at
343.
46. 348 So. 2d at 342.
47. Id. The court limited its holding by continuing, "When as here the legislature has
clearly specified the consequence of delay, emergency created wholly by an agency's failure
to take timely action cannot justify extraordinary suspensions or extensions of the statutory
schedule." Id.
48. 355 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
49. Id. at 1246.
50. Id. at 1247. A provision of the Division of Labor's emergency rule provided that a
program applicant could file a written request with the Bureau of Apprenticeship, request-
ing that no action be taken on its application pursuant to the emergency rule. Agency action
would then be held in abeyance until the Division's final and permanent rules were adopted.
A majority of the court, over a strong dissent by Judge Booth, ruled that licensing appli-
cants who are permitted by the provisions of the emergency rule to exempt themselves from
its application, have no standing as adversely affected parties to obtain judicial review. Id.
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agency whose permenant rulemaking has been temporarily blocked
by a rule challenge may resort to emergency rulemaking only when
the delay actually creates an emergency. Delay alone, though, will
never justify allegations of an emergency."'
The most direct impact of the Krajenta decision will be in the
area of "sunset" legislation under which regulatory agencies must
be reestablished by the legislature at least every six years.5 2 Rees-
tablished agencies will not be able to use emergency rulemaking to
reinstate their rules of practice and procedure. Krajenta makes it
clear that following any change to agency functions, the full pano-
ply of procedural safeguards found in the "normal" rulemaking
procedures must be used by the agency in adopting any new rules
of practice or procedure.
More generally, Krajenta and its predecessors indicate that an
agency's claim of imminent public danger will be closely scruti-
nized by the courts. Neither agency inaction nor changes in agency
function alone will adequately support a claim of immediate dan-
ger to the public sufficient to validate the adoption of emergency
rules." Despite the relaxed procedural safeguards in emergency
rulemaking, the courts recognize the need to insure that agency
decisionmaking is not arbitrary.5 4 In Krajenta, the Division
stepped beyond the applicable boundaries in attempting to adopt
its emergency rule. The trend begun by Times Publishing, Postal
Colony, and Florida Home Builders is becoming clear: the mere
absence of rules, whether caused by the delay inherent in normal
rulemaking or by agency inaction, will never by itself create an
emergency sufficient to support promulgation of emergency rules.
PETER BELMONT
51. Id. at 1246.
52. FLA. STAT. § 11.61(6) (1979).
53. In spite of the emergency rulemaking requirements that an immediate danger must
exist to the public health, safety, or welfare prior to adoption of an emergency rule, 276
emergency rules were adopted by agencies in 1979. JoiNT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
COMM. ANNUAL REPORT, January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1979, at 6-8.
54. For a thorough discussion of the role of agency procedure in the context of the fed-
eral APA see Hahn III, Procedural Adequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking: A Unified
Formulation, Part I, 30 AD. L. REV. 467 (1978).
